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INTERPRETING LAW: JESUS, THE LAWYER, AND THE PARABLE 
OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN 
Calum Carmichael* 
Alan Watson’s remarkable range of interests and insights includes his 
studies in law and the gospels.  His is a unique voice in the world of 
scholarship and it is a privilege to address a topic in biblical law in 
acknowledgment of the incalculable benefits that Alan’s major works have 
conferred on so many scholars and lawyers worldwide.   
Biblical law should particularly appeal to law students, not necessarily for 
any ethical, legal, or religious value it may possess, but for the way in which 
its rules came to be formulated.  The method on display is similar to how 
American law students are taught to uncover rules from cases.  In an 
excellent introduction to the study of American law, the jurist Karl Llewellyn 
urges law students when first handling cases to knock their ethics into 
temporary anesthesia and immerse themselves in the cases.  “Dig beneath the 
surface, bring out the story, and you have dramatic tales that stir, that make 
the cases stick, that weld your law into the whole of culture.”1  By absorbing 
themselves in the issues that turn up in the cases and making judgments on 
them, law students learn the relevant rules and their refinements.  When we 
deal with biblical law, dramatic tales served up in the biblical texts provide 
the cases, and digging beneath their surface brings out the issues on which 
the lawgivers render judgment.2  I shall illustrate this process at work by 
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focusing on two famous stories in the Bible: the Joseph story in the Book of 
Genesis in the Old Testament and the parable of the Good Samaritan in the 
Gospel of Luke in the New Testament.  The Genesis narrative about Joseph, 
the ancestor of the Samaritans, is fundamental to the parable’s meaning.  The 
link which connects story and parable, not hitherto noticed, is the rule in 
Leviticus 19:18 about loving one’s neighbor, the central point of discussion 
in Luke’s parable.  That this law was itself formulated to encapsulate a major 
aspect of the Joseph story has gone unrecognized and the parable’s 
assessment about the neighbor in the rule proves in turn to be a miniature 
version of the Joseph story. 
First, I will provide some brief remarks about the nature of biblical law.  
With the exception of the deity’s postdiluvian communication of rules about 
killing animals and humans,3 and his delivery of the Decalogue at the 
founding of the Israelite nation,4 biblical rules issue from the legendary 
lawgiver Moses.  In reality, the text is a production of anonymous writers 
who look back and reflect on events (be they mythical, fictional, or 
historical), recount in narratives, and make judgments about matters of 
concern.  These judgments are expressed by Moses and God, who speak as 
seers or prophets able to anticipate the future.  In a notable example, Moses’ 
rule about kingship foresees the institution that came into existence long after 
his time.  The rule prohibits a monarch from multiplying horses, wives, 
silver, and gold.  Moses anticipates, well before the event, King Solomon’s 
unacceptable actions.5 
We are in the dark about the authors, formulators, or compilers of the 
laws.  We can think of these fundamentally important but unknown persons 
as working in the context of scribal schools.  There is little point in 
speculating about their education, attachments, or standing in society.  What 
we can say is that their rules belong to the world of instruction in wisdom 
and rhetoric.  Familiar with legal rules and customs extant in their own time 
and place, the authors would have woven that knowledge into rules 
articulated in the biblical text.  Their purpose was not, as is commonly 
thought, to set down a law code to govern functioning society, although 
some rules may well have done so.  Instead, in the interest of bolstering 
national identity, probably in the exilic period after the loss of the monarchy, 
they fashioned laws that contained ethical and religious judgments in 
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response to problems in the nation’s legendary past.  The aim was to furnish 
ideal laws, commitment to which held out a promise of a future time of peace 
and rest from enemies.  The laws convey a spirit that is nationalistic and 
universalistic at the same time: foreign nations will “hear all these statutes, 
and say, surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.”6  
Love of neighbor rule: To begin a discussion of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan we must start by looking at the rule in Leviticus concerning love 
of one’s neighbor.  In an abbreviated form the rule that “[y]ou shall love your 
neighbor as yourself” is central to the discussion between Jesus and a lawyer 
in Luke 10:25–27 when Jesus, responding to the lawyer’s inquiry about who 
his neighbor is, relays the incident about the Good Samaritan. 
The original rule in Leviticus 19:18 reads: “You shall not avenge, nor 
bear any grudge against the sons of your people, but you shall love your 
neighbor [who is] like yourself: I am Yahweh.”  There is a puzzle in 
comprehending the rule.  If it had read “you shall be kind to a neighbor,” 
then little or no problem would exist except that we would want to know 
what prompted a moral injunction hardly needing to be stated.  But to be 
commanded to love—yes, the emotion of love—a neighbor, rather than to 
befriend or reach out or some milder emotional stance, is odd.7  The added 
requirement to love the neighbor as one loves oneself just adds to the 
bewilderment.  It is difficult to imagine that back in the biblical period the 
author of the injunction would have in mind a notion of self-esteem, although 
it is common these days to read the rule this way.  A typical contemporary 
comment on its appearance in the parable of the Good Samaritan is: “One is 
to have the same esteem and care for a neighbor that one would have for 
oneself.”8  The notion of self-love is a product of the therapy culture of 
recent times but not one to be attributed to ancient sources such as the Old 
and New Testaments.  No doubt there is something in this common view but 
it fails to take seriously the rule’s emphasis on the emotion of love and how 
the positive injunction is tied to the preceding prohibition against another 
emotion, vengefulness. 
The original formulation of the rule in Leviticus presents obvious 
problems.  Why does the injunction read “who is like yourself”?  On 
syntactical grounds alone, lere‘aka kamoka means “your neighbor who is 
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like yourself,” that is, an Israelite.9  Because Moses addresses the rule to the 
Israelites, and because the first part is explicitly about “the sons of your 
people,” the second part must also refer to a fellow Israelite.  The repetition 
of the idea, however, about a kindred Israelite (“like yourself”) seems 
redundant, an example of apparently unnecessary emphasis that is therefore 
puzzling.  In the time of Jesus, in keeping with its original focus, the rule was 
largely taken to exclude non-Jews, for example, in the Damascus Covenant 
6:20–7:1.10  Why also would one counsel someone to counter the emotion of 
vengefulness and the bearing of a grudge with the raw emotion of love?  As a 
general piece of moral advice the injunction seems quite unrealistic. 
The rule becomes transparent when we consider how ancient lawmakers 
typically formulated legal or ethical rules.  In the earliest sources of law (of 
which the Bible is one) a lawgiver’s inclination was to focus on a specific 
case and to formulate a rule in response to it.  The lawmaker avoided 
articulating a larger principle that might cover a number of cases but went 
from one set of circumstances that trigger consideration to another and 
recorded his differing judgments.11  What then was the set of facts that the 
Leviticus lawgiver scrutinized in his rule about replacing vengefulness with 
love? They came directly, I submit, from the Joseph story. 
The situation under review in the rule pertains to a climactic development 
in the story.  The relationship between the brothers and Joseph is one in 
which the emotions of hatred and love are entangled, but in the end love 
trumps hatred.  The initial part of the rule concerning vengefulness focuses 
on how Joseph acts on a grudge and pays back his brothers for their evil 
treatment of him.  When the brothers come to Egypt to buy food to relieve 
the famine back in their own country of Canaan, they do not recognize 
Joseph, who is now governor in Egypt. Bearing a grudge and taking 
vengeance, Joseph puts his brothers through experiences that echo the hateful 
act they had perpetrated against him when he ended up in Egypt as a foreign 
slave.  The following constitute these experiences: the brothers had 
concealed the true nature of Joseph’s fate by having their father believe what 
his eyes told him, namely, that Joseph’s bloodstained coat signified that he 
had been killed by a wild beast.  Joseph, in turn, accuses the brothers of 
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offending with their eyes: they are spies who have come to view “the 
nakedness of the land.”12  Again, the ten brothers caused their father grief 
over the loss of his favored younger son Joseph.  This son now causes them 
anguish by insisting that they bring the remaining, youngest son Benjamin to 
Egypt.  By being pressured to do so, the brothers will burden themselves by 
once more causing their father great pain.  Yet again, the brothers had sought 
but did not in fact receive money for selling Joseph as a slave.  He now 
torments them through the use of money.  By surreptitiously slipping money 
into their sacks of grain after they have already paid for it, he causes 
consternation among them.  The money represents the payment they never 
received for trying to sell him.13  In these different ways Joseph keeps alive 
the memory of the brothers’ offense against him and in doing so exhibits a 
vengeful attitude.14 
Vengefulness, however, is not the only emotion at work in the story.  
Although Joseph certainly pursues grudges against his brothers, affection for 
them also wells up in him.  When the brothers in the presence of a disguised 
Joseph interpret what is happening to them in Egypt as retribution for what 
they had done to him, Joseph turns aside and weeps.  Later, when Benjamin 
comes to Egypt, Joseph “yearned upon his brother, and he sought where to 
weep, and he entered into his chamber, and wept there.”  When, 
climactically, Joseph reveals his true identity to his brothers, “he wept aloud” 
and “kissed all his brethren, and wept upon them.”  Lurking behind Joseph’s 
vengeful hounding of his brothers is his genuine warmth for them.  He is one 
of them, intimately bound to them as a member of the same family.15  In this 
narrative about hatred within the first family of Jacob-Israel, Joseph is 
portrayed as wanting nothing more than to be part of it.  Feelings are very 
much on display.  The narrative is about vengefulness and love—the same 
striking combination of emotions in the law.  In light of the rule’s 
background inspiration, the reference to the emotion of love in the rule 
should not be toned down.  In most situations it is not realistic to counsel 
against vengefulness by requiring that love be put in its place.  The situation 
within Joseph’s family, however, presents precisely this juxtaposition of the 
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two opposite emotions.  We shall note that Luke’s parable is about khesed 
(loving kindness), a term that is a variant of ’ahavah (love) and, as one critic 
underlines, a spontaneous, natural emotion.16 
Why, seemingly redundantly, does the rule speak of loving a neighbor 
who is an Israelite like oneself? Joseph becomes an Egyptian, marries an 
Egyptian woman, has children by her, and dresses as an Egyptian.  He is so 
Egyptian, in fact, that he cannot even sit down at a meal with his visiting 
brothers because of the food rules observed by Egyptians.17  Yet when the 
brothers turn up in Egypt from the neighboring country of Canaan, Joseph 
instinctively feels kinship with these neighbors.  Overcome with affection 
despite what they did to him, he recognizes how powerful the tie is that binds 
him to them.  Not only does Joseph wish to restore fraternal relations, but he 
goes on to insist that they bury him with his and their forefathers.18  Love of 
his brothers replaces the grudges he had borne and leads him to shed his 
Egyptian identity for his previous one and to renew the bond with his fellow 
countrymen.  In a foreign land Joseph’s brothers are Israelites like him and 
Joseph is an Israelite like them—hence the rule’s notion of a neighbor being 
like oneself, namely, an Israelite.19 
The rule about love of neighbor in Leviticus 19:18 concludes with the 
assertion: “I am Yahweh.”  In the story, Joseph attributes to Yahweh the 
entire series of life-affirming events in Egypt.  Yahweh, he claimed, brought 
good out of evil,20 which was an affirmation of Yahweh’s providential 
guidance and beneficence.  In Luke’s parable, love of God is affirmed as 
conferring life. 
The Good Samaritan: The parable reads as follows: 
And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and tested him, saying, 
Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?  He said unto 
him, What is written in the law?  how readest thou?  And he 
answering said, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy 
heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with 
all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself.  And he said unto 
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him, Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou shalt live.  But 
he, willing to justify himself, said unto Jesus, And who is my 
neighbour?  And Jesus answering said, A certain man went 
down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which 
stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, 
leaving him half dead.  And by chance there came down a 
certain priest that way: and when he saw him, he passed by on 
the other side.  And likewise a Levite, when he was at the 
place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other 
side.  But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he 
was: and when he saw him, he had compassion on him, And 
went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and 
wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, 
and took care of him.  And on the morrow when he departed, 
he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto 
him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, 
when I come again, I will repay thee.  Which now of these 
three, thinkest thou, was neighbour unto him that fell among 
the thieves? And he said, He that shewed mercy on him.  Then 
said Jesus unto him, Go, and do thou likewise.21 
Jesus recounts the parable in a conversation with a lawyer about the two 
fundamental commandments: loving God and loving a neighbor as oneself.  
The discussion is primarily taken up with the interpretation of the law, the 
Torah.  Of all the questions that could be asked, the lawyer asks who his 
neighbor is.  Jesus responds with the story about the man who goes from 
Jerusalem to Jericho and encounters thieves.  They strip him of his raiment, 
wound him, and leave him half dead.  Of three passersby only a Samaritan 
gives aid.  In answer to Jesus’s question as to which of the three acted as 
neighbor to the victim, the lawyer replies: “He that showed compassion to 
him.”  Jesus tells him to do likewise. 
One of the major questions that arises is why the priest and the Levite are 
singled out in Luke’s parable.  The question is the central focus of a study by 
Michel Gourgues.22  Gourgues readily disposes of a common explanation 
that these temple officials feared levitical defilement.23  He focuses on why 
an Israelite has not been added to the other two estates to signify what he 
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claims is the standard division of the Jewish people.24  He argues that the 
omission of a lay Israelite as an actor in the story is deliberately intended by 
Jesus to cause the lawyer surprise when instead a Samaritan turns up.25  
Gourgues thinks that the substitution of a Samaritan for an Israelite 
constitutes a reversal of roles with the effect that a Samaritan becomes the 
model of neighborly love.26  A good deal more has to be said about the 
Samaritan.  He stands for Joseph, the first ancestor of the Samaritans.  The 
priest and Levite are significant as a pair because they stand for Joseph’s 
brother, Levi, the eponymous ancestor of the priestly caste in ancient Israel.  
The juxtaposition of the Samaritan on the one hand and the priest and the 
Levite on the other represents the then extant religious division between the 
Samaritans who affirm the Mount Gerizim temple and the Jews who adhere 
to the Jerusalem temple.  A reversal of another kind also underlies the 
parable, one that relates back to Joseph’s change of attitude to his brothers. 
The conversation preceding the communication of the parable is, as 
already noted, between Jesus and a lawyer.  The discussion is therefore not 
for a general audience but presumably confined to those familiar with modes 
of interpreting law back then.  The conversation might not seem to be a 
technical one but when the lawyer asks to “justify” his question about who 
his neighbor is, a specialized inquiry is indicated: a fuller, sharper 
comprehension is sought.27  Surprisingly from our viewpoint, the discussion 
comes down to Jesus’s presentation of an incident about the victim of an 
attack.  What, we might ask, has this response to do with legal hermeneutics?  
A good deal is the answer. 
For the story to communicate its message, we do not really need to be 
given the identities of three of the players, the priest, the Levite, and the 
Samaritan.  The fact that we are indicates the importance of the information.  
One aim of the story would appear to be to show up the two members of the 
priestly tribe of Levi.28  The victim’s identity is not given, as we might have 
expected, and this absence also appears to be significant.  What is clear is 
that the larger, primary aim of the discussion is to test Jesus’s knowledge of 
the nature and contents of the law about loving one’s neighbor as oneself.  
As Derrett points out, the question Jesus puts to the lawyer, “[h]ow readest 
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thou [the rule]?” is about how to interpret a biblical rule because the 
conversation is primarily concerned with the interpretation of the Torah, “the 
ethical and practical ‘law’ (which is the business of a nomikos).”29  Derrett 
refers to Jesus as a legislator in the matter and speaks of the parable as “a 
highly scientific piece of instruction clothed in a deceptively popular style.”30  
Because the law, as we have observed in detail, is a distillation of the Joseph 
story, I propose that the test requires Jesus to provide a comparable story that 
reveals his awareness of the law’s origin and how the law applies to his time 
and culture—in a word, Jesus must demonstrate his expertise in 
comprehending the inner character and formation of the Torah.  As one 
learned in the law, he has to prove to be a nomikos too. 
What indications might point to the parable as an encapsulation of the 
Joseph story?  We should first note that in line with its definition, a parable 
(“from paraballein, to throw alongside”31) is the juxtaposition of a story, in 
this instance the one about the Samaritan, alongside another story, the Joseph 
story, as I claim.32  Here are some insights regarding the role of the Joseph 
story.  One, the victim of the thieves’ attack in Luke recalls Joseph as a 
victim at the hands of his brothers: each is assaulted in inhospitable terrain, 
each is stripped of his coat, and each is likely to die if no one intervenes.  
Thievery, moreover, also plays a major role in Joseph’s plight, for his 
brothers sought to sell him to merchants.  Why is the victim in the parable 
given no identity, especially since the other players enjoy one?  It might first 
be pointed out that after Joseph had been attacked and thrown into a pit, 
stripped of identifying features (the coat), taken out of the pit and sold, he 
became as anonymous as the poor fellow on the road to Jericho.  The victim, 
as presented in the parable, could easily belong to any one of the tribes (or 
none for that matter).  The larger explanation for his non-identity is that in 
light of developments in the Joseph story, the victim in the parable stands for 
any Israelite, any son of Jacob.  The crucial observation here is that Joseph 
was initially the victim in the Genesis narrative, but the other brothers 
became victims like him because the disguised Joseph in Egypt initiated 
actions against them that mirrored their hostility to him.  (Perhaps Benjamin 
should be excepted, although it is true that Jacob feared that this son’s fate 
would be that of Joseph.33)  What links all of the brothers as casualties is the 
role of vengeance in the story: the brothers gang up against Joseph and he 
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pays them back in kind.  Vengeance is a central feature of the rule about the 
love of neighbor (“You shall not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the 
sons of your people”), and that rule, we saw, is derived from the Joseph 
story.34 
Two, in the parable a priest and a Levite, each of whom is descended 
from Joseph’s brother Levi, ignore the victim’s fate.  These two temple 
officials represent Joseph’s brothers (including Levi) who callously pay no 
heed to Joseph’s calls for help.35  Why, however, if ten of the brothers were 
involved in the assault on Joseph, is the brother Levi solely represented in 
the parable?  The explanation is that his two descendants in the parable 
represent one side of the divisiveness between Jews and Samaritans 
prevailing at the time.  That tension centered on their deeply conflicting 
views about the proper site of the temple.  For the Jews it was Jerusalem, but 
for the Samaritans it was Mount Gerizim.36  Tellingly, the antagonism comes 
out in Luke’s gospel just before Jesus relays the parable.  He and his 
disciples pass through a Samaritan village but the local population refuses 
them hospitality.37  Why?  Because “his face was set toward Jerusalem,” that 
is, the place of a temple repugnant to the Samaritans.38  Two of Jesus’ 
disciples, the brothers James and John, wish to call down fire on them—fire 
is heaven’s way of dealing with evildoers—but Jesus rebukes them.  The 
intergroup conflict between the Samaritans and the Jews, represented by 
Jesus and his disciples in this context, is a version of the first ever ancestral 
conflict involving Joseph and his brothers (among whom Judah, the ancestor 
of the Jews, played a dominant role as the one seeking to sell Joseph).  The 
priest and the Levite are consequently singled out in the parable because they 
represent the Judean temple, the focus of intense discord between the two 
groups of Israelites.39  
Three, the Samaritans traced their origin to Joseph.  Indeed, in biblical 
texts as well as in the Dead Sea Scrolls, a mention of Joseph can serve as a 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Leviticus 19:18. 
 35 Genesis 42:21. 
 36 See Menachem Mor, The Persian, Hellenistic and Hasmonaean Period, in THE 
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 38 Id. at 9:53. 
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Jerusalem temple).  Josephus describes the disturbing incident when Samaritans cast human 
bones on the site of the temple in Jerusalem. FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, JEWISH ANTIQUITIES 18.29–
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veiled reference to the Samaritans.40  At the outset of the Genesis narrative 
the ancestor of the Samaritans, Joseph, needed rescuing from his plight, and 
the brothers in turn needed rescuing from theirs because a disguised, 
vengeful Joseph visited hostility on them similar to what he had experienced 
at their hands.  Like Joseph when he was a victim of kidnapping and about to 
be sold into the anonymity of slavery, the brothers were treated by Joseph as 
persons with no identity in a foreign land, indeed in the spying incident as 
captive slaves.  The ten brothers, like the two members of the tribe of Levi in 
the parable, offered no assistance to the victim of an offense.  Contrastingly, 
despite Joseph’s acts victimizing his brothers in Egypt he does in the end 
move to rescue them from the troubles he caused them and from the 
prevailing famine.  His acts restore their mutual identity as sons of 
Jacob/Israel.  The Samaritan in the parable is reminiscent, then, of his 
ancestor Joseph helping his brothers in their grim situation.  But if the 
emphasis in the parable is on the Samaritan as Joseph, initially as victim, 
then on rescuing this victim, the dual identification seems strange.  What we 
must take into account, however, is the curious problem of loving a neighbor 
as oneself.  Joseph made his brothers victims because they had made him a 
victim.  The rule requires the overcoming of vengeful feelings with 
compassion and that is exactly what Joseph achieved.  In subjecting his 
brothers to suffering, he recognized their plight and recalled his suffering at 
their hands.  The anonymous victim in the parable stands for any such 
unfortunate among the sons of Jacob/Israel.  Attending to him, the Samaritan 
recalls the example of the first son of Israel, his ancestor Joseph, which 
instructs the Samaritan to give aid to fellow victims of misfortune. 
Four, Preston Sprinkle also views the Joseph story as providing raw 
materials (chiefly linguistic) for the parable of the Good Samaritan.41  An 
important link he brings out is when Jesus says to the lawyer, after the latter 
recites the two commandments about love of God and love of neighbor, 
“[t]his do, and thou shalt live” (Luke 10:28).  The remark is intended to recall 
Joseph’s exhortation to his brothers when he tells them that they must bring 
Benjamin to Egypt if they wish to live (Genesis 42:18, 43:8).42  If they do not 
                                                                                                                   
 40 See Preston M. Sprinkle, The Use of Genesis 42:18 (not Leviticus 18:5) in Luke 10:28: 
Joseph and the Good Samaritan, 17 BULLETIN FOR BIBLICAL RESEARCH 193, 205 n.46 (2007) 
(citing 4Q372 frag. 1:10b–15a).  He also draws attention to the Hebrew additions to the 
Testament of Naphtali, in R.H. CHARLES, THE APOCRYPHA AND PSEUDEPIGHRAPHA OF THE OLD 
TESTAMENT 2.361–.363 (R.H. Charles ed., 1913).  Sprinkle cites Josephus in Jewish 
Antiquities, supra note 39, at 9.291: “When they [the Samaritans] see the Jews prospering, call 
them their kinsmen, on the ground that they are descended from Joseph and are related to 
them through their origin from him.”  See also DERRETT, supra note 16, at 219. 
 41 Sprinkle, supra note 40, at 193–205. 
 42 Id. 
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bring Benjamin, their brother Simeon will remain permanently in prison and 
no food will again be provided them to relieve starvation back in their own 
country.  They respond, I would point out, by recalling in the presence of the 
disguised, victimizing Joseph the very incident of his ordeal in the pit: “And 
they said one to another, We are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that 
we saw the anguish of his soul, when he besought us, and we would not hear; 
therefore is this distress come upon us.”43  In the parable, the initial attack on 
the victim evokes the young Joseph’s fate, and the right thing to do is to 
attend to the wounded man because the law about loving a neighbor as 
oneself, which is observed by the mature statesman Joseph, is the model. 
Five, the treatment of the victim in the parable is modeled on an incident 
in 2 Chronicles 28:8–15, a narrative that is itself a reprise of the Joseph 
story.  On the counsel of the prophet Oded, four Samaritan chieftains treat 
their captive Judeans (Jews) well.  The saga is written so as to illustrate that 
Joseph’s descendants during the period of the monarchy behave like him.  
Joseph had been initially hostile to his kin in Egypt, but eventually he was 
compassionate.  These Samaritans first attack their kin, the Judeans, and take 
them captive, but then care for them, in the end treating them as brother 
Israelites, sons of Jacob-Israel.44  Specifically, the Samaritans bind up the 
wounds of their Judean victims and take them to safe haven in Jericho, a city 
bordering the territories of Samaria and Judea.  The Samaritan in Jesus’ 
parable in turn imitates his ancestors written about in 2 Chronicles 28:8–15.  
He binds up the victim’s wounds and takes him to safe haven in Jericho.  It 
has been well observed that the Lukan parable incorporates previous biblical 
material about Samaritans and Jews.45 
Once we observe the crucially important and hitherto unrecognized link 
between the rule in Leviticus and the Joseph story, the parable turns out to be 
an updated version of that story, and thus the telling of the parable as an 
explanation of who is one’s neighbor makes sense.  The abbreviated form of 
the rule, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself,” moreover, proves 
particularly revealing.  To turn back again to the Genesis saga: recall that 
Joseph, the first Samaritan, eventually becomes the rescuer of his brothers 
when in Egypt he subjected them to circumstances similar to those that he 
                                                                                                                   
 43 Genesis 42:21.   
 44 2 Chronicles 28:11. 
 45 See DERRETT, supra note 16, at 210–11 (listing the likely links with other biblical texts 
and arguing that little in the story suggests an independent, imaginative composition because 
biblical history has contributed so much to its contents).  The view is contrary to that of 
JOACHIM JEREMIAS, THE PARABLES OF JESUS 203 (1963) (“The story . . . has . . . probably 
arisen out of an actual occurrence.”).  See also Sprinkle, supra note 40, at 193–205 
(emphasizing the link with the Joseph story). 
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had experienced at their hands.  The parable recapitulates the Genesis story.  
In helping the wounded man, the Samaritan represents the Joseph who 
helped his family in the time of famine in Canaan and Egypt.  The wounded 
man, in turn, represents the Joseph who fell victim to abuse by the brothers.  
The victim and the Samaritan are two aspects of the same figure, Joseph.  
The principle, loving a neighbor as oneself, encapsulates what happens in the 
parable.  The victim and the Samaritan who cares for him both represent the 
same person—hence love of self. 
Luke’s use of the abbreviated form of the original Leviticus rule is 
especially intelligible in the context of the discussion between Jesus and the 
lawyer.  Jesus knew that the formulation of the rule about the love of 
neighbor was tied to the Genesis story.  He points his questioner, the lawyer, 
to the rule’s starting-point, the wounding of Joseph by his brothers.  In Luke, 
both the lawyer and Jesus are testing each other’s knowledge of the Torah.  
By evoking the Genesis saga, the parable provides the correct context for 
understanding the rule about loving a neighbor as oneself.  Being well 
educated in matters of law and tradition, the lawyer is directed by means of 
an equivalent story to the original link between the rule and the Genesis 
narrative. 
Not long before the time of the New Testament, interpreters related other 
biblical rules to Genesis narratives.  The Testament of Gad 6:1–5 in the 
Pseudepigrapha (probably second century BCE) connected an injunction in 
Leviticus 19:17 to the Joseph story.46  The rule, “thou shalt not hate thy 
brother in thine heart: thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbour, and not 
suffer sin upon him,” precedes the rule in Leviticus 19:18 about the love of 
neighbor.  In the document, Joseph’s brother Gad explicitly links the rule to 
the relationship between Joseph and his brothers.47  Jesus elsewhere again 
ties a biblical rule, about divorce, to a Genesis narrative.  He directs his 
audience of Pharisees to the stories of creation in Genesis to detect a 
prohibition of divorce there.48   
The recapitulation of a story in Genesis is a feature of the material that 
immediately precedes the Good Samaritan parable.  Jesus gives directions to 
seventy of his followers about a mission that will initiate the end-time 
                                                                                                                   
 46 JONAS CARL GREENFIELD, MICHAEL EDWARD STONE &ESTHER ESHEL, THE ARAMAIC LEVI 
DOCUMENT 19 (2004) (arguing that because we can date the Testament of Levi to the third or 
very early second century BCE, the other testaments, including the Testament of Gad, fall 
within this time period). 
 47 CHARLES, supra note 40, at 341, 292–93; see also James L. Kugel, On Hidden Hatred 
and Open Reproach: Early Exegesis of Leviticus 19:17, 80 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 49–61 
(1987); CALUM CARMICHAEL, LAW, LEGEND, AND INCEST IN THE BIBLE LEVITICUS 81–82 
(1997) (arguing on other grounds for a link between the Joseph story and Leviticus 19:17). 
 48 Genesis 1:27, 2:24; Deuteronomy 24:1–4; Mark 10:2–12; Matthew 19:3–12. 
710  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:697 
 
process of gathering together all the nations of the earth.49  Inspiration for the 
instruction is the story in Genesis 10 of the seventy nations spread abroad on 
the earth after the flood.  Also, when Jesus goes on to pronounce doom on 
Chorazin and Bethsaida and contrasts their future fate with that of Tyre and 
Sidon, he is recalling the doom of Sodom and Gomorrah in Genesis 19.50  
Like the parable of the Good Samaritan, not only do the contents of Luke 10 
evoke Genesis narratives, Luke makes them relevant to current matters.51 
In sum, if we assume knowledge of biblical texts on the part of the 
characters, as we certainly should, the parable will have evoked the Joseph 
story, especially the initial dramatic event of the assault on Joseph, which 
triggers all the following ones: the indifference of observers, his brothers, to 
his plight; the direction (“this do and you will live”) of the disguised Joseph 
to bring Benjamin to Egypt; and the ultimately merciful attitude of Joseph, 
the ancestor of the Samaritans, to his fellow-Israelites (including Levi).  A 
message of the parable is that the lawyer, like his fellow Israelites, the priest 
and the Levite, should affirm the example of the Samaritan because the rule 
about loving a neighbor as oneself expresses the marvelous outcome of the 
first Samaritan’s conduct at the nation’s origin.  God transformed the ruin 
planned for Joseph into welfare for all, and in doing so had Joseph love his 
brothers as Israelites like himself.  Loving God and loving a neighbor as 
oneself prove to be the two life-giving commandments.  In telling the parable 
Jesus is not, as commonly thought, affirming an ethic of universal love.52  
His focus is more parochial.  The disputing Samaritan and Jewish factions of 
his time should embrace the kind of forgiveness and reconciliation on display 
at the climax to the Joseph story and show compassion to one another 
because they are brother Israelites, sons of Jacob.  Fundamentally, however, 
the discussion is about the formation of the rule and how someone skilled in 
jurisprudence furnishes an updated version of it in a demonstration of legal 
hermeneutics. 
 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Luke 10:1–24. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See CREED, supra note 27, at 144, 146 (linking Luke 10:1–24 with Genesis 10 and 19); 
see also Thomas Louis Brodie, Greco-Roman Imitation of Texts as a Partial Guide to Luke’s 
Use of Sources, in LUKE–ACTS: NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL 
LITERATURE SEMINAR 23–26 (Charles H. Talbert ed., 1984) (detailing the enormous role of the 
reworking of ancient texts in both Jewish and Greco-Roman literature at the time). 
 52  See, e.g., FITZMYER, supra note 8, at 884–85 (referring to Luke’s “universalism”).  
